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One of the factors underlying Taiwan’s industrial growth
over the past two decades has been the availability of a pool of
underemployed, young workers who will accept relatively low
wages, who are unlikely to raise demands for higher pay, shorter
hours, or seniority benefits and who, in many instances, expect
only short-term employment. Women are a significant segment of
this industrial work force. By the start of the 1970s, at least
20% of the employed population over the age of 15 was engaged
in manufacturing. Of these, 33% were women, most of whom
were between the ages of 15 and 25 (Taiwan Provincial Labor
Force Survey and Research Institute, 1971). While their male
counterparts, also relatively young, held an expectation of
continuous employment, increased skill-learning and job
advancement within the factory workplace, the women workers
were more likely to see their jobs as a brief interim between
school and marriage (Kung, 1976).
A major concern in my research is the effect of outside employ-
ment on women’s status, autonomy, and control over their future
and present lives. There is a fairly simplistic model of women’s
liberation in circulation which assumes that increased participa-
tion in the work force by women will modify or radically change
their position within their natal households and give them the
power to shape their future lives. There is no question that
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the passing of &dquo;traditional society&dquo; (i.e., peasant society) and
the rise of capitalist, industrial society does generate legal and
social changes which enhance women’s status. In Taiwan, as
elsewhere, women have received the right to own property, the
right to seek divorce, the right to vote and to stand for election
to public office, access to at least a primary school education,
and of course the increased opportunity to work outside the
domestic sphere. Changing social mores have raised the age
at which people expect to marry, and young people are allowed
more of a choice in that decision. Emulation of American and
Japanese lifestyles, reinforced by ~ media presentation, has
affected many things, from fashions and cosmetics to family
form and recreational activities..
However, it would be a mistake to attribute these various
changes to the fact that young women now work in factories and
shops rather than on the family farm. Most of these changes, if
not all, originate in the upper classes and filter down to the
working class. They are part of bourgeois culture, and to the
extent that they benefit women, working-class women will to
some degree share in those benefits. But as this article hopes
to demonstrate, women working in the factories (and, by ex-
tension, in other similar low-paid, low-skill jobs) have neither
power within the household nor real control over their lives
in the ways that earlier writers have suggested (Fei, 1939;
Lamson, 1931; Lang, 1946). On the contrary, in the Taiwan
case women’s wages usually remain under the control of the
household head, and women’s work, whether inside the house-
hold or outside in the shops and factories, is defined as an ex-
tension of their familial duties. Women work as members of
households, not as individuals. For many, the situation is
little different from the past when women contributed to house-
hold income by home weaving and spinning, or participation
in agricultural work as was somewhat the case in southern
Taiwan. 
z
The most notable difference between the present and the
past is that young girls now have more visible value to their
families. They are useful wage earners at an age when their
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brothers are still students, low-paid soldiers (to whom the
family often sends money), or unpaid craft apprentices. Girls’
refusals of an early engagement meet with acquiescence and
small sighs of relief from families who look forward to a continua-
tion of their daughters’ earnings. One hears less about &dquo;useless
daughters&dquo;: whatever the initial costs of raising a daughter
might be, they are repaid during the five to ten years that she will
work outside. With careful management some of the daughter’s
earnings can be applied toward her dowry, enhancing her
marriage opportunities, and giving the family additional prestige.
But none of this should be confused with the issues of inde-
pendence or power for working girls.
The data in this article, and some of the generalizations I am
making, come from a set of interviews with women textile
workers in Tainan City in 1970. ~ In some ways, the situation
of these young women workers of the late twentieth century
resembles that of the female workers in factories in the United
States and England during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. We are dealing with a period in which there is heavy
migration from the rural to the urban areas, a decline in the
actual numbers as well as in the proportion of the work force
engaged in agriculture, a decline in the prevalence of small-
scale handicraft enterprises, and the rise of a new middle class
and working class. In many households, daughters are the first
in the family to enter the modern sector. Women are, in fact,
actively recruited and encouraged into industry by factory
representatives who go out to the rural schools, and families
are eager for them to take advantage of these new opportunities.
Yet it is clear that women enter industry on a different basis
than men. For both local entrepreneurs, and for foreign industry
seeking the advantages of Taiwan’s low-cost labor supply, women
are ideal workers in that neither they nor anybody else considers
it necessary or desirable that they receive an independent wage.
Few receive earnings that would adequately meet living costs
and present-day consumer expectations for a single individual
living on her own, let alone sufficient wages to support a house-
hold. Most women workers are unmarried and either live at
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home, thus saving on the cost of bed and board at no expense to
the employer, or they are accommodated in factory dormitories
under spartan conditions at little cost to the employer. There
is no social support for the idea of working girls having an
apartment together, free of adult supervision. Certainly it
is cheaper for employers than providing salaries which would
cover the single worker’s rent. On the other hand, many factories
provide simple meals, subsidizing part of the cost, for their
live-in workers, which is a fringe benefit or hidden wage. Still,
women workers cost less than males who over time expect and
require wages high enough to support not only themselves but
also a wife and children, and who in addition require enough
to maintain a separate household and / or contribute to the
maintenance of aging parents.
What becomes of the girls’ wages? The answer to that question
is that the earnings of unmarried daughters are usually remitted
to parents to supplement the budget of the larger household,
with some portion retained as pocket money. The latter sum
usually increases in amount, if not proportion of total earnings,
over the years that the girl spends in the factory. There is, of
course, some hope of higher wages, sought by transferring
to another factory where one has heard one can earn a bit more.
Nevertheless, and this is particularly true for the youngest
workers, the basic attitude is that whatever money one can hold
over and beyond the costs of bare subsistence is a windfall
for which, one ought to be grateful. This first generation of
proletarians is a very filial one, and repayment to parents an
unavoidable obligation.
There are a few other generalizations to be made at this
juncture, which flow from the age range of Taiwan’s industrial
work force. As indicated earlier, some 75% of factory women
fall between the ages of 15 and 24. Some are younger, although
it is technically illegal to hire below age 15. Few are older because
most factories will not hire married women or allow their women
workers to continue employment after marriage. The same
holds true for many clerical and sales jobs as well. For most
female workers, going &dquo;outside&dquo; or &dquo;into society&dquo; to work means
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entering a social milieu composed almost exclusively of young,
unmarried females like themselves and, more importantly, a
milieu which reinforces traditional goals of marriage and defini-
tions of femininity consistent with parental views and those of
society at large. The opportunity to earn money has not generated
a &dquo;marriage-resistance movement,&dquo; as happened in Guangdong
(Topley, 1975). For those who live at home, marriage rather
than employment is the marker of adult status. The same is
true for those living in factory dormitories, in a world of ado-
lescent friendships and sharing of knowledge that they know
must be short-lived. Factory life fails to bring the young women
into contact ~with older or married women workers or with
men who are potential friends and marriage partners. The
absence of trade unions under the present government further
isolates each factory’s workers into their own closed circle, where
concern with interpersonal relations between workers in the
same shop or dormitory takes precedence over class conscious-
ness (Kung, 1979). Paradoxically, the experience of working
in the factory is, for most, an intense socialization toward middle-
class values and bourgeoise dreams.
LIFE AT XINFENG: A MEDIUM-SIZED TEXTILE PLANT
The factory from which my interviews were taken lies midway
between the massive modern plants established by foreign capital
and the small sweatshops that mark the beginning of indigenous
industrialization. The Xinfeng Textile Plant (a pseudonym) is
a modern plant employing almost 400 people, 320 of whom are
young women who work as machine operators, checkers,
packers, or group supervisors. Some other women work as clerks
in the business office or as cooks and dormitory matrons. The
administrative, technical, and higher managerial jobs are all
held by men, most of whom live with their wives and children
in company-owned apartment buildings behind the factory. The
women workers are all unmarried, and virtually all of them live
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in dormitories on the factory grounds. Most are between the
ages of 15 and 22.
Xinfeng is regarded locally as a progressive enterprise. Unlike
many other factories, it holds to a 48-hour work week, whereas,
according to government figures, 43% of women industrial
workers labor between 49 and 56 hours a week, and another 15%
works 7 hours or more with or without overtime pay (Taiwan
Provincial Labor Force Survey and Research Institute, 1971:
50). It hires relatively few girls under the legal age (only 14% of
the sample reported being hired before they were 15). It provides
fringe benefits such as a lounge with TV and pingpong tables,
the promise someday of a swimming pool and tennis courts for
employees, and classes in English, sewing, and dress design. Wage
levels compared favorably with other textile plants, ranging at
that time from a low of $800 NT (about US $20) per month for
new workers to a high of $1800 NT (US $45) for female office staff
with an average income of US $28. Wages have since risen, but so
have living costs.
By any standards, the dormitories provide the most minimal
comforts. They do have the advantage of being free. They are
unfurnished: each girl gets floor space for the bedding she brings
from home, and little more. Even the poorer peasant homes have
at least bamboo bedsteads or raised sleeping platforms with
thick straw mats. The smaller rooms sleep 10 girls, the larger
rooms 20, which is greater density than that found in household
sleeping arrangments. However, the factory runs three shifts
a day, so the rooms are never totally filled at any one time.
Nor are the subsidized meals luxurious: a meal ticket, which
costs about US $5 per month entitles the holder to a meal of
rice, topped with vegetables and a few snippets of meat. It is
the diet of the poor.
Realistically, few of Xinfeng’s workers have the option of
living at home. Over 70% of the girls are drawn from the rural
areas of Tainan county, and from the neighboring counties of
Gaoxiong, Jiayi, Zhanghua and Pingdong. Commuting is
impossible. Even for those with close family or relatives living
in and around Tainan City, the dormitory is more convenient.
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Work shifts rotate every week, so that everyone would have
to face the possible dangers of traveling to or from work around
midnight. Further, there would be difficulties in meshing one’s
needed sleep time with the activities of a household on a normal
schedule. The work itself is tiring, not only from the strains
of standing during the eight-hour shift but also from the high
noise levels in the machine rooms. The dormitories are con-
venient for napping during free time as well as for regular sleep-
ing. To all these reasons, we must add the observation that most
of the Xinfeng women seem to come from fairly large households.
Not one in our sample was an only child, and very few were the
youngest in households where older sisters might have married
out and brothers gone off to do their army service. Most lived
in crowded houses, with an average of 3.1 younger siblings
at home and another 2.7 older siblings. Dormitory living pro-
vided an opportunity to rest that might be impossible at home,
as well as relieving household congestion. And some of the
girls see the dormitories as luxurious in one sense. In each cor-
ridor there are bathrooms with hot showers, flush toilets and
sinks, items not found in peasant and working-class homes,
as a rule.
It should also be mentioned that Xinfeng is not totally isolated.
In fact, it is well within the city, a short bus ride from the down-
town area with its department stores, movie houses, restaurants,
and coffee shops. The immediate neighborhood is a mixture of
residences and small family-operated workshops and stores, with
its own secondary market area containing food stalls, cheap
second-run movie houses and shops selling inexpensive clothing
and daily necessities. For many of the factory girls, who come
from rural villages, even this smaller market area represents
urban excitement and sophistication. Although the work is
tiring, and there is considerable supervision of the girls in addi-
tion to peer pressures, there is the opportunity to pick up some
veneer of big city sophistication by walking around the city
in one’s free time, seeing a movie, or buying a snack at a sidewalk
restaurant. There is also some opportunity of meeting new male
friends.
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The token educational facilities offered by the factory probably
give parents the feeling that they are offering their daughters
an opportunity to better themselves and learn something about
the society while at the same time earning wages and lessening the
family’s burden. Unlike the electronics factory described in
Kung’s articles (1979, 1976), few of Xinfeng’s workers have a
fixed work schedule which allows them to attend junior high
school or senior high school classes. Those that do are already
employed as accountants and clerks in the business office,
keeping regular office hours. Work/study is not an option
offered to ordinary workers. Still, the women themselves see
their factory experience and its fringe benefits as an opportunity
to learn about the world. Most seem to enjoy dormitory living
and being together with their peers. Living and working at
Xinfeng brings them into contact with a larger number of people,
and they must learn to understand them and to adjust to those
of different backgrounds and temperament. For many, one of the
greatest values of their work experience as they see it is that it has
made them more adept socially and has taught them to be more
tolerant of differences. Coexisting smoothly with 20 roommates
is after all a different problem from getting along with family
members or classmates. It prepares one to face almost any
eventuality, and the learning of social skills is highly valued.
THE REMITTANCE OF WAGES
Control over money was not one of the gains of the work
experience. It was a privilege of 5% of my sample: remittances
home from those living in the dormitories came to about 46%
of gross earnings on the average, while those living at home felt
obliged to turn over anywhere from 70% to 80% of their wages
to their parents. There was no relationship between the number
of years working at Xinfeng or elsewhere and the portion of
salary remitted home. Women in their sixth or seventh year
of employment were just as likely to turn over half of their
earnings, or more, as were women just starting to work for wages
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outside the home. The amounts remitted seemed more to be
determined by household need. It is, of course, possible that
the informants exaggerated the sums sent to the household,
but if so the exaggeration is uniform and suggests an expectation
that working daughters should and do turn over all money
beyond that needed for their own food, clothing, daily necessities,
and transportation expenses.
It would be a mistake to assume, as I initially did, that this
money was being put aside as savings, consciously alloted for the
girl’s future dowry. In some cases (about 23% of the sample) it
was directed toward that end; in most cases it was not. To assure
that they would enter their marital homes with a fair amount
’off property, the majority of the women were putting aside
additional savings (around US $2.40 to $5 per month) for that
purpose. In addition they took advantage of the sewing classes
at the factory. and the chance to buy good material at cost to
make their own clothing. At least they would enter marriage with
a respectable wardrobe. For the rest, their pocket money was
spent on items of clothing that they could not produce them-
selves, or cosmetics, magazines, snacks to supplement the
cafeteria fare, and occasional movies.
The money turned over to one’s parents was seen as a re-
payment to them for money spent during one’s first 14 or 15
. years of life, but it was an indirect repayment in many cases.
For a few, their earnings were the mainstay of the household
or a major contribution: this was true for around 6% of the
sample whose fathers were dead or incapacitated, and who had
become a major source of support for mother and younger
siblings. Most saw their contribution as amounting to between
20% and 40% of household cash income, and earmarked for the
schooling and maintenance of younger and elder brothers during
an extended education. The girls themselves, with few exceptions,
had ended their own formal schooling with six years of primary
school. Their brothers, however, were expected to at least finish
junior high school, go on to senior high school if at all possible,
and ideally continue on to college or technical training. ,
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Whereas in Fei’s study in the 1930s daughters’ remittances
made it possible for households to meet their rent obligations
as tenant farmers or to maintain their peasant standard of living
(Fei, 1939), these remittances in Taiwan in the 1970s had become
a way for households to begin the move out of peasant status. In
the overall household strategy for upward mobility, teenage
girls are a valuable resource. Their earning abilities, though
small, make the crucial difference which enables their brothers
(and sometimes a younger sister) to gain a higher education
which opens the door to white-collar and professional jobs
(or at least to skilled blue-collar jobs) and to good social connec-
tions.
During the 1960s, as mentioned earlier, participation in agri-
culture had begun its decline. While over two-thirds of the
factory girls came from households of farmers and fisherman, in
only 10% of those families had brothers followed their parents’
occupation or given any indication that they were planning
to do so. These are families that do not intend to continue as
peasants. In 20% of the households, some or all of the brothers
were also working in factories. In 45% of the households, any-
where from one to three male siblings were enrolled in senior
high schools, technical schools, colleges, and universities. In
22% of the households, one or more brothers were currently
working in white-collar jobs or doing highly skilled work. For
those brothers doing their army service at the time of our inter-
views, we can assume that the same proportions would hold.
Sons’ education greatly outstripped that of other household
members; it is worth mentioning that all but 10% of the mothdrs
of the factory girls were illiterate, as were over half of the fathers,
and less than 6% of the fathers had gone beyond primary school-
ing.
Given parental educational level and experience, it is not
surprising that they might see themselves as already having done
the best they could for their daughters’ by allowing them to
finish primary school and then sending them off to work in a
factory until they married. The sisters of most of the sample
were either working at Xinfeng or similar plants (55%), or helping
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out at home with the care of younger siblings, farm work, or
management of a small family business. In only 20% of house-
holds where there were unmarried girls over the age of 15 were
any of them attending school. Taiwan still is very traditional:
the expectation is that sons will carry the responsibility of caring
for parents in their old age, while daughters are &dquo;water spilled
on the ground,&dquo; a waste of investment after a certain point.
If a daughter cannot be useful staying at home to help out then
she might as well begin working when she completes her primary
education. It is sons who are the hope for one’s future, and it
is for sons that sacrifices should be made. Nor do girls seem
to resent working on their brothers’ behalf; it is their family
duty to do so..
This pattern in which young women join the labor force in
order to advance their brothers’ careers is not unique to Taiwan,
of course. One is reminded of immigrant girls working in the
sweatshops of New York at the turn of the century, while their
brothers studied to be doctors and lawyers at City College.
The pattern may also raise some of the same problems when it
comes to marriage. As the men move up the social ladder via
education, they develop expectations of marrying women with
educations somewhat closer to their own, from families of
higher status or greater respectability. A university graduate
wants a wife whose background is commensurate with his newly
won social standing, not a poorly educated factory hand, similar
to the girls he would have married had he never gained an edu-
cation.
PLANNING AND HOPING FOR THE FUTURE
As Kung would agree, factory work has little glamour or
prestige, though it is preferable to farm labor. It is a poor &dquo;fate&dquo;
or a &dquo;bitter lot,&dquo; even though it pays better than being a servant
and is more interesting and prestigious than helping out at
home. Given other options, only 15% of the young women in my
sample said they would want to cdntinue working at the same
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job. The ideal job, in the eyes of 42%, was tailoring work, a
skill which many were learning in their spare time. For others,
a job as a store clerk seemed preferable, or a job in some other
section of the factory where the work was lighter. And some
wished for office and clerical jobs, had they the requisite education
level. If they had had more control over their lives they would
have at least finished junior high school; they would have sought
white-collar jobs for theniselves. A sizeable number saw the
factory evening classes as a way out: they might someday open
a small tailor shop, though it was not clear where the capital for
this would come from.
But because there is no way for most of them to advance their
formal education or open a shop, it is marriage which is regarded
as the realistic, possible route to upward mobility for them-
selves. The wishes and expectations that these young women
hold about marriage differ little from those of their more for-
tunate middle-class and upper-class sisters. They dream of
marrying someone who is a government official, a lawyer, doctor,
teacher, businessman or white-collar worker. They dream of
marrying what their brothers hope to become. Relatively few
envision their future as marriage to a factory worker or the
owner of a small shop. None see themselves repeating their
mothers’ lives, being farm-wives. -
Their dreams are not totally out of line with reality. Far more
peasant and working-class sons receive education than do
daughters, and given the fact that in the society overall women
hold only a third of the places in senior high schools and colleges
it is fairly obvious that most of these men will not be able to
marry unless they marry &dquo;down&dquo; educationally. Some of them
will marry less educated factory workers. Given the persistence
of male chauvinist thinking in Taiwan, there will always be
some educated men who choose a less educated wife on the
theory that she will make a better mother and a more docile
spouse. It is rare, but not unknown in Taiwan, to meet men
with graduate degrees and semiliterate wives, even among the
younger generation. Xinfeng’s girls have at least completed
primary school, they are literate (highly so, in comparison
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to their mothers), and the combination of dormitory living
and exposure to urban life has given them some self-assurance,
social skills, and sophistication in manner and dress which
marks them off from peasant girls who have remained at home
in their &dquo;green years.&dquo; Indeed, when dressed up for their day
off or for a walk in their free hours, they are not that easily
distinguished from their middle-class counterparts.
For the time being, though, marriage is still something off
in the future and undecided in any way for most of the women.
No more than 5% of them admitted to being formally engaged
(usually through introductions and arrangements made by
their parents, family friends, older brothers, and matchmakers).,
though I suspect the numbers are higher. Another 9% said that
matches had been suggested to them by their parents, but they
had refused- This is an important aspect of control over their
own lives, one which more girls may take in coming years.
Some, still a minority, seek control over their futures by
maintaining friendships with young men: about one-fourth of
the sample claimed to have a &dquo;special&dquo; male friend. In most
cases it was someone introduced through family connections
and friends. In a few cases, it was a pen pal found through a
magazine advertisement. In even fewer cases, it was someone met
on their own initiative. One of the older girls told us proudly
that she was soon to be married to a government worker she
she had met at the city swimming pool. Most of the male friends,
however, whether met through introduction or one’s own
efforts, were described as factory workers, sales clerks, artisans,
or soldiers, not as the rising professionals of their dreams, and
the girls themselves were mostly over 20, nearing marriage
age. Younger girls did not have boyfriends, generally.
Their envisioned marriages are middle class in content. Most
expect that they will drop out of the labor force when they marry:
few desire to keep working past the first pregnancy, and given
the realities of the job market, there is little chance that they
can keep working. They look forward to being full-time house-
wives and mothers, unlike most of their own mothers whose
domestic roles included farm work, petty trade, or assistance
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in the family small business. They look forward to having
children. Despite recent government backed campaigns for
family planning, most of them expressed a desire for two or
three sons and two daughters. Married life itself was visualized
within the framework of a modern (nuclear) family: only 20%
expressed any positive feelings toward living in an extended or
joint family with husband’s parents and/or married brothers.
Their views of married life have been strongly influenced by
the middle-class model presented in the mass media: not only
television, to which they have easy access, but also the novels,
short-story magazines, movie magazines, and women’s maga-
zines which circulate in the dormitories and enjoy enormous
popularity. Six years of education may not seem like very
much, but this is a group that is keeping its literacy alive. Some
40% of the sample reported the reading of popular fiction and
magazines as their first choice of a leisure time activity, and
could list two or three magazines that they read regularly as
well as current popular novels that had appealed to them.
Even if one’s real life husband may fall short of the mark, in
terms of ideal expectations, there is still faith that a rise in social
status will come through one’s children. More than half of the
sample were hopeful that their sons would graduate from college:
some even envision them going on to do advanced graduate
studies in America (a common theme in popular literature).
Aspirations for daughters are more modest, reflecting the
lower levels of expected achievement for women in the society
generally, but there is the expectation that one’s daughters
will continue past primary school and complete a senior high
school education (and 27% thought that their daughters would
go on to college). Daughters would also have careers com-
mensurate with their education: they would be schoolteachers
and nurses. Still, while none of the girls visualized their sons
going into anything other than white-collar and professional
jobs, there were some who saw nothing out of place in expecting
their daughters to work in factories prior to marriage.
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FILIAL PROLETA RIA NS
The envisioned rise into the middle class does not and should
not imply any serious conflict with parental values and disci-
plines. The parents of the peasantry and working class share
in the dream right now: they are investing heavily in the educa-
tion of their sons and encouraging their daughters to sacrifice
for those sons. Going out to work in the factories is a family
strategy, not an individual attempt to shape one’s life. Virtually
all of the young women had entered the work force with parental
support and encouragement, in order to contribute to household
finances. Where opposition to the job had been voiced by parents,
it was in terms of disapproval of the general working conditions
at Xinfeng and / or the belief that the daughter could find a
better job elsewhere. Only 8% of the women we interviewed
indicated that one or both parents disapproved of their working
and wanted them at home, or working nearer to home.
Moreover, very few of the women believed that they would
follow through on major decisions such as going to Taibei to
work if they met with parental opposition. Most took pride in
being obedient and loving daughters who followed parental
advice and plans-both parents and daughters in this instance
shared the hope that the girl would marry a man with more
education than herself and who held a respectable and decently ,
paid job. There are some areas of conflict, of course, over such
things as use of cosmetics, new fashions in dress, recreational
activities, and choice of closest friends. Here, there are some
attempts at deception, keeping certain things hidden from
parents. It can be easily done because most of the young women
do not try to commute home every week: it is too expensive
and tiring. By not living at home, most of these women are
at a disadvantage in influencing family decisions such as major
purchases or educational or vocational plans for siblings. And
on personal or minor aspects of autonomy, such as dress or choice
of friends, the physical distance enables them to avoid direct
confrontation with family opinion.
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Most of the girls still feel very close to household members
and identify with them. Here and there, one finds mavericks
who insist that they are unique and different from others in
their family, that they move in a different mental world or that
no one at home is capable of understanding them: it is difficult
to attribute this to the fact that they are working. Rather, they
tend to be the young women who have escaped from home,
sometimes over parental opposition, because factory life enables
them to survive outside of the family milieu. In earlier times they
would have sat at home being miserable, or perhaps resorted
to suicide. They are critical of their own families, or even ashamed
of them, but they do not reject family life per se.
Given the continuation of close family ties, and the lack
of any real financial independence or chance to gain the training
that would make independence possible, it is not surprising that
women in the sample tended to look toward their parents and
other family members to arrange their eventual marriages.
Despite exposure to new ideas through the media, it was a clear
minority (13%) who thought that women should arrange their
own marriages: this was an important decision which was best
left to one’s elders. One factor at work here may be their social
isolation during the working week. Unlike college students
or office workers, there is little opportunity to meet young
men and gradually form friendships with them in this kind of
work setting. In the end, the girls rely still on parents and kin
networks for assistance. Though they admire the idea of choos-
ing one’s spouse and the idea of a marriage based on love, most
of them are unable to carry out this ideal.
Moreover, the experience of working has not made for drastic
changes in the perception of women’s abilities and roles in the
society at large. These are still girls who are in strong agreement
with such traditional sayings as &dquo;a daughter follows her father,
a wife follows her husband, a widow follows her son.&dquo; The
superiority of men to women is unquestioned by most of these
young women. Less than 10% voiced disagreement with the cliche
that &dquo;men’s place is outside the home, women’s place is inside.&dquo;
Indeed, how could it be otherwise when the models one has
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of working women are either unmarried girls or women in the
poorer segments of the society and women of the peasant class?
And even with the opening of education to girls, the sample
was split down the middle in its agreement or disagreement with
the Confucian maxim that &dquo;a woman’s virtue lies in having
no talents.&dquo; 
.
The shift of opinion on this last item merits some further
commentary. As mentioned before, factory work carries little
prestige if any, and these working girls admit to feelings of
inferiority when they compare themselves to girls who have
been fortunate enough to continue their schooling. Student
life is glamorized in Taiwan. College days particularly are seen
as a happy and carefree time leading to an even brighter future.
There is envy and regret in many cases over the fact that one’s
family circumstance did not allow for a prolongation of the
student life. Middle-class girls can continue their educations
even if they are not brilliant students: their families will hire
tutors for them; their parents will pay for private schools if
they fail to pass the examinations into government schools.
But for many factory women, even an outstanding primary
school performance would still have made no difference in
determining their future lives. They would still have been en-
couraged into the work force at the age of 14. So there is some
comfort in repeating the belief that women do not need advanced
education or the kinds of skill training available to men, even
though they envy the prestige that higher education brings,
or the chance for a better job.
The major shift from traditional views of women, as suggested
earlier, is on the question of the usefulness of daughters compared
to sons. There is no question now but that daughters are of
use to their families. In many households, daughters are at
some point in the family cycle more useful than are their student
brothers, or the brothers who are soldiers or unpaid craft ap-
prentices. They can act out male roles of filiality and support
which were closed to them in the past. There are even some
who can visualize themselves as being useful economically
for the first year or two of their married life: one-fourth of the
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sample expressed the desire to continue work even after marriage,
but only up to the point where they have children. Within the
limits imposed by the structuring of the labor force, these women
seem to question the traditional hard-line view of female in-
equality and women as passive dependents on the men in their
lives. One wonders, of course, whether such feelings might
not have been present in more traditional times, when filial
daughters labored at home to produce silk and cotton cloth for
the market. Perhaps the point to be gained here is that such
feelings can be more clearly articulated when the money comes
to the girl from the factory, for her to disperse, rather than
going directly into the hands of the male household head. Nowa-
days, there is the illusion of choice about how one’s earnings
are to be allocated, whereas in the past there was no choice
and women’s contributions to the household economy were
masked, or denied. The girl might not have known how much
her labor was worth. Today, she has a clearer idea of the house-
hold total, and her contribution to that total. It is irrelevant
that the term of employment is only temporary (when one is
young, seven or eight years is a long time), or that the wages
of women workers are half or less than half the wages of male
workers.
Economic usefulness to one’s fa.mily does not lead to au-
tonomous decisions or independence for most girls. As suggested
earlier, few of the girls under the age of 20 yet have a special
male friend. Even for the elder girls, for whom marriage is soon
in the offing, their relationships to boys are usually initiated
and approved by their family, and the young man is then welcome
to visit at their house. Dating involves an occasional walk,
a movie, a snack somewhere, or going out with friends. One
does not &dquo;date&dquo; more than one boy-dating is a serious matter.
Sexual activity prior to marriage is strongly frowned on: I have
no way of judging whether this last is rhetoric or reality, but
given the living circumstances of young people, it is unlikely
that there is opportunity for premarital sexual experimentation.
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THE MUTING OF CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS
One must assume that the sample of women from Xinfeng
resembles many other young factory women elsewhere in Taiwan.
They are filial proletarians with strong family ties. The general
political atmosphere in Taiwan encourages familism, and a
second-place status for women (Diamond, 1975); and young
working women do not appear to question seriously the status
quo. If pushed to the brink they might resist an undesired
arranged marriage by withholding remittances and / or appealing
to their families’ good will. In the Taiwan setting, they are
encouraged toward identification with middle-class lifestyles
and values, and many of them will take little from their factory
days into their future lives except for the social skills and some
of the friendships that they have gained there.
The one thing that factory work experience clearly does
not do for either sex is heighten class consciousness and political
awareness. Lydia Kung suggests that whatever resentments
or negative feelings that arise from the work situation itself
tend to be focused on interpersonal relationships: the social
problems of dealing with group supervisors or foremen, as
well as the social problems of relating to work group peers
and dormitory mates (Kung, 1979).
If we look back to the labor movement on the mainland of
China during the 1920s and 1930s, we find that large numbers
of women were similarly employed in light industry at wages
markedly inferior to those accorded to male workers. Many
of the female workers were indeed children (i.e., under the
age of 12), and many, if not most, were recruited under a labor
contract system in which agents recruited girls from the country-
side, paid their families a small sum, allotted some funds for
food and shelter, and effectively pocketed half or more of the
women’s actual wages, which were quite low to start with (Wales,
1945; Chesneaux, 1968). In Shanghai, the most industrialized
area at that time, women workers made up more than half of the
labor force. They were preferred because of their docility and
their willingness to accept low wages. Most, though by no means
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all, of the major labor disturbances that occurred involved male
workers, who had been effectively organized into trade unions
and politicized. Women workers in Shanghai were 52% of the
labor force, but only 15% of union membership in the late 1920s,
before the Guomindang abolished real labor organizations
and forbade strikes (Mao, 1928). -
Still, there were brief periods of labor militancy on the part
of women workers: a majbr strike in 1923 by cotton mill and
cigarette factory women in which 10,000 women participated,
for example, or the series of strikes in the tobacco industry,
which was staffed almost entirely by women workers (Wales,
1945: 195-198). And although many of these were short-lived
and limited to only one factory, the number of strikes by women
textile workers between 1919 and 1926 was not only relatively but
absolutely greater than in any other industry (Chesneaux,
1968: 379)..
However, many of these early strikes in the Chinese labor
movement were over issues that have been resolved by the
&dquo;paternalism&dquo; of factory management in Taiwan today, whether
it be foreign-owned enterprises or local plants. There is no
need to strike over the issue of corporal punishment, absence
of a lunch period or washroom facilities, kickbacks of pay to
foremen or hiring agents, and so on. Sleeping space is provided
in dormitories rather than under the machines, and the 12- or
14-hour day is a thing of the past. Most modern plants conscious-
ly try to provide a few &dquo;frills&dquo; and to show the goodwill of
management toward its employees. Some factories even make
it possible for the workers to study toward middle-school degrees
by having fixed work times, and there is the opportunity there
for upward occupational and social mobility and perhaps greater
independence. As for increased political awareness, we can
only point out that male workers are equally unorganized and
politically silent, though their income needs are greater. The
temporary nature of women’s employment makes it unlikely
that they will risk losing present day gains by engaging in what
the government regards as illegal activity. For the time being,
at least, the bettering of their futures lies in making the ideal
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middle-class marriage, and it is there that their concerns are
focused. Given the relative scarcity of educated women as
potential partners for upwardly mobile peasant males, their
dreams are not out of line with reality.
NOTE - ..
1. In this study, 134 women (roughly a third of the work force in a medium-size
factory) were interviewed with a lengthy questionnaire covering family background,
education, reasons for working, monthly budgets, dating and engagement, marriage
plans, areas of controversy with parents, relations with parents and siblings, workplace
social relations, use of leisure time, future job aspirations and plans, marriage and future
family expectations, and degree of consensus with proverbial or traditional sayings
about women. Some of the information presented here comes also from discussions
with factory managers, dormitory matrons, and observations within the factory.
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Appendix
Some Sample Case Histories
1. She is now 19 years old, and has been working on the weaving
machines at Xinfeng for the past year. Before that she worked for
three years at a smaller factory closer to her home in rural Tainan
county. Her mother does much of the work on the family’s small farm,
while her father works as a small merchant. She estimates that without
her help the household income would be only NT $3,000 a month.
She contribues NT $800 of her salary to the household, and keeps
the remaining NT $500 for her own use, which includes her NT $180
for a meal ticket at the factory, and the pocket money she needs for
clothing and odds and ends. Her main reason for working is family
circumstances plus her desire to have some money in hand for her
own use. Besides, she prefers being at a factory with other girls to
helping her mother on the farm. There is one older sister, who is now
married and gone from the household. Her teenage brother is a middle-
school student. There is no pressure on her to get married or even
engaged: the family has not yet suggested any engagement plans for
her, and none of the money that she is remitting home is being set
aside for her dowry. She is basically a filial daughter, close to her
parents emotionally and glad to be useful to them and to her younger
brother. The one point on which she has gone against parental wishes
is in transferring to work at Xinfeng, where she has no choice but to
live in the dormitory. Her parents would prefer that she continued
living at home, even though she now gets higher wages than what
she earned before.
2. She is 20, and has been working steadily at Xinfeng for the past
five years. Despite this long tenure, her earnings are low compared
to other girls at her level but she does not seem to mind. Nor does she
mind that all but $140 of her earnings are turned over directly to her
parents. She lives at home, under parental supervision and that of
her four elder brothers and two sisters-in-law. Though she says that she
is working merely to help pass the time until she marries, the heavy
family claims on her income suggest otherwise. Her family is strongly
opposed to her living in the dormitories, and similarly opposed to
her having male friends. As yet, they have not taken any steps to
introduce her to a suitable marriage partner or arrange an engage-
ment. Cut off from the social life of the dormitories, she spends most
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of her free time either sleeping or reading enormous amounts of fiction.
Though she has only six years of formal education, she is fond of
romantic modern novels and short story magazines. She sees herself
as less socially adept, less lively and outgoing than most of her work-
mates and is somewhat ill at ease with them.
3. She has been working at Xinfeng for a year and a half, and has .
just turned 16. Her parents, who are peasants, were eager that she
follow her older sister to the factory. The two girls are very close, and
share the same dormitory room: she is grateful for her sister’s presence
because as she says, she still feels shy with some of the other girls in
the dorm. As a relatively new worker she earns little more than NT
$800 a month, but she dutifully sends half of it home. The family has
three younger daughters, and one son on whom the hopes of the future
seem to be fixed: he is the only one attending middle school, though
perhaps one of the younger girls may also have that option. Unlike
most of her peers, she thinks she would enjoy marrying into a large
family because of the company that it would provide during the day,
though she would want it to be an urban household, perhaps one with
a large family business.
4. She is also 16, and second generation working class: both her
father and her elder brother work in factories in Tainan. Her second
eldest brother is a senior high school student. The family never con-
sidered further schooling for her. She began work when she was 13,
and entered Xinfeng when she was 15 as an experienced worker. She
earns close to NT $1,100 a month and sends NT $480 of it home. Her
pocket money goes quickly on clothing and cosmetics, of which her
parents clearly disapprove. She also spends a more than usual amount
of time at the movies, and is an avid reader of movie magazines and
fashion magazines. Yet despite this, she is more grounded in reality
than some of her peers: she is one of the few who does not have fantasies
that she will marry a college graduate. Indeed, she says she would be
satisfied to marry someone with a steady job of any sort, and to see
her children go on to high school so that they in their time can find
work to do what they will really enjoy.
5. It is hard to tell if she is a disappointment or a blessing to her
family. Her father is a rural schoolteacher, and her elder sister and
four younger brothers and sisters are in school. She, on the other
hand, went directly from primary school to work in a textile factory
for two years, and then transferred to Xinfeng two years ago. She is
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now 17. Her earnings are high: over NT $1600 a month, of which half
is sent home to assist the family. She feels that she is working to please
her parents and to enable her younger siblings to study. At the same
time she says that her father wanted her to continue in school and is
displeased with her, that her reason for working is that she did not
enjoy being a student. Despite her disclaimers of being intellectually
oriented, she reads widely and more seriously than most of her dorm
mates, and remarks that she feels inferior to girls who have gone on
in their formal schooling. Despite her father being a teacher, she would
prefer to marry someone in business or an accountant, and she currently
has a &dquo;boyfriend&dquo; who is a pen pal. They have yet to meet face to face.
6. She is from a large rural family, with both parents totally illiterate.
Now 17, she has been working for almost two years at Xinfeng, after
a brief stint as a salesgirl. Her earnings are still beginner’s wages, and
almost half of it is remitted home to aid in the support of four younger
siblings and a brother who is a college student. She reads little except
for women’s magazines, and watches television a lot. In her dreams
of the future, she wants to marry a college graduate who has a secure
civil service job. Further, she hopes that her sons will study abroad
and come home with Ph.D. degrees or become medical doctors, and her
daughters will all successfully graduate from college and become
schoolteachers. Of all the household members, she is closest .to and
most admiring of her elder brother, perhaps also hopeful that he will
be able to aid her in securing her own future as she dreams of it.
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